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Rebuilding the Ukrainian Navy 
 
The rapid and illegal annexation of the Crimea in 2014 by the Russian Federation has had a 
profoundly negative effect on the Ukrainian Navy. After the seizure, the Ukrainian Navy was 
described by many commentators as having been ‘decimated’ or ‘destroyed’.1 Andri Ryzenko, 
the former Deputy Head of the Ukrainian Navy, described the fleet, as an ‘operational shadow 
of its former self’ in urgent need of modernisation and rebuilding.2 As a result of the Russian 
annexation, the Ukrainian Navy lost the majority of its warships, including its most modern 
platforms, access to its military and maritime infrastructure and ports in Crimea and the 
majority of its maritime service personnel. The Ukrainian Navy also lost access to a third of its 
Black Sea coastline, control of the Kerch Straits and access to the defence industries located 
in Crimea.3 Despite the slow return by Russia of some of Ukraine’s maritime platforms, the 
seizure by Russia of many of Ukraine’s major warships and much of its naval aviation and air 
assets has dealt a serious blow to the already small Ukrainian navy. In light of these severe 
losses, and the realisation of the important role maritime forces can play in the war in the east 
and, in protecting Ukraine’s interests in its EEZ, there is a growing recognition within the 
Ukrainian Government of the need to rebuild the Ukrainian Navy. This necessity was outlined 
in 2015 in Ukraine’s military doctrine. It points out the importance of reviving ‘the naval 
potential of the state, of the Naval forces of Ukraine’ to enhance Ukraine’s security.4 In 
October 2014 the Ukrainian President, Petro Poroshenko, confirmed his government’s 
commitment to modernising and upgrading the Ukrainian Navy. He stated that Ukraine would 
equip the navy with state of the art precision weapons making the ships more effective.5 This 
commitment by the President was reiterated just over six months later during a visit to Odessa 
where he announced plans to ‘revive’ the Ukrainian Navy so that the fleet could ‘become a 
strong stabilising factor in coastal regions’.6  
This paper examines the attempt by the Ukrainian Government to rebuild the Ukrainian 
Navy and explores the many challenges that it faces. As such, it is divided into three sections. 
The first section examines why maritime power is important to Ukraine. It argues that 
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Ukraine’s commercial and economic interests have already been adversely affected by the 
lack of a Navy. The war in the east has revealed the vulnerability of Ukraine’s coastline, and 
Russian seizure of maritime infrastructure, as well as attempts to drill in Ukraine’s territorial 
waters, have also reinforced the urgent requirement to re-build the fleet. The second section 
explores the range of difficulties facing Ukraine in re-building its navy. These factors include 
the impact of the Russian annexation of Crimea, the lack of coherent and realistic concept for 
the navy, and Ukraine's economic and political instability. The final section outlines the 
quantitative and qualitative aspects of Ukraine’s maritime power and evaluates what progress 
has been made so far in rebuilding the Ukrainian Navy. Overall, the outlook for the Ukrainian 
navy is problematic. The material challenges facing the attempt to rebuild its capabilities are 
multiplied by wider difficulties in defining exactly what kind of navy that Ukraine should have. 
As a case study, an examination of the Ukrainian navy is interesting for many reasons. It 
illustrates the often intrinsic link between land and maritime power: for Ukraine's navy, the loss 
of Crimea has been equivalent to or worse than the loss of a fleet action. It demonstrates the 
problems of 're-building in contact,' where medium to long-term maritime interests may have 
to be mortgaged against short-term military needs. Finally, it demonstrates the problems of 
generating maritime capabilities in a weak state context in which economic and political 
instability interfere with the ability to establish and implement effective maritime policy and 
strategy. 
 
Ukraine as a maritime state 
Long land borders and proximity to Russia necessarily have given the Ukrainian state a strong 
continental focus. But Ukraine also has important maritime interests. Ukraine's President, 
Petro Poroshenko, has stated unequivocally that ‘Ukraine, was, is and will be a maritime 
state.’7 Some of these maritime interests are economic in nature but others are military-
strategic. Ukraine's economic maritime interests have been spelt out by the Deputy Head of 
the Ukrainian Navy, Andriy Ryzhenko, who pointed out that Ukraine’s prosperity, its economy 
and the potential growth of tax revenues depend upon the realisation of its maritime potential. 
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A quarter of Ukraine’s GDP is generated by the five regions with access to the sea.8 Ukraine’s 
maritime ports and maritime infrastructure in the Black Sea are important national strategic 
facilities.9 Before the annexation, Ukraine had 20 commercial seaports, eighteen of these 
were state owned, and together they contributed more than UAH 1.55 billion (approximately 
$150 million) to the Ukrainian state budget.10 While Ukraine has lost access to five of its ports 
located in Crimea, it retains the four important commercial ports of Odessa, Illichivsk and 
Yuzhny, located on the north western coast of the Black Sea, and Mariupol in the Sea of 
Azov. Taken together these ports account for almost 70% of the total commercial cargo into 
Ukraine. In a sign of their significance to the Ukrainian economy, Ukraine increased its 
container turnover by almost 6% in the first quarter of 2016.11 Further demonstrating the 
economic importance of these ports, it was announced, in early 2016, that $100 million had 
been invested by a private company to build a grain terminal in Yuzhny.12 Ukraine’s ports also 
matter as Ukraine has an export oriented economy and is a major exporter of machinery, 
grain, coal, steel and fertilizers which are shipped out through its ports. Indeed, these are of 
growing importance and from 2015 to 2016 Ukraine increased its export volume by 12%.13 
Mariupol, for example, is the busiest commercial maritime hub on the Sea of Azov, and, 
before the Russian annexation of Crimea, produced almost a third of the Donetsk region’s 
total industrial output and over 70 percent of the regions steel production.14 There is therefore 
clearly an important need for Ukraine to be able to protect trade and its commercial ports in 
the future to secure future economic growth and development. As a result of these important 
maritime economic and commercial interests the rebuilding of ‘a modern navy equipped with 
warships’ is clearly necessary to protect Ukraine’s national interests.15 
Direct threats to Ukraine's land-based maritime interests have been accompanied by 
challenges to its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Illustrating Ukraine's growing vulnerability in 
this sphere, in December 2015 Russia hijacked three offshore oil drilling rigs, worth hundreds 
of millions of dollars, located in Ukrainian territorial water at the Odessa gas field about 100km 
east of Ukraine’s coastline and towed them back to Crimea.16 Ukraine’s State Border Service 
claimed that these seizures also demonstrated that Russia has plans to begin drilling for oil in 
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Ukraine’s EEZ.17 This suspicion was confirmed in July 2016 when Ukrainian border guards 
spotted jack-up rigs, stationary platforms and support vessels under Russia’s national flag in 
the Odessa and Holitsyno gas field located in Ukraine’s EEZ.18 Fearing additional possible 
incursions and drilling in its EEZ, in February 2016, the Ukrainian Navy and the State Border 
Service's Marine guards enhanced the security of Zmiinyi Island in the Black Sea near 
Ukraine.19 Zmiinyi Island, with a population of about 100 people, is part of Odessa oblast and 
sits about midway between the Odeske natural gas fields and the coast of Odessa Oblast.20 A 
unit of Ukrainian marines equipped with heavy weapons landed on Zmiinyi Island in a pre-
emptive attempt to prevent any further encroachment by Russia into its EEZ or attempt by 
Russia to block Ukraine’s future development of its hydrocarbons.21 
Ukraine's maritime interests are also military in nature, interests that have been sharpened 
by the ongoing conflict in the east of Ukraine against separatist and Russian forces. The 
protracted conflict in the east and the vulnerability of the strategically important city of 
Mariupol, an industrial port located on the Azov Sea some 100 kilometres from the rebel held 
capital Donetsk, has also created an incentive to rebuild the Ukrainian Navy. Mariupol is a key 
battleground and the frontline in the conflict in the east between Russian backed separatists 
and Ukrainian forces. Mariupol is an important strategic prize for the separatists and is a 
decisive point in the ongoing conflict. Taking Mariupol would give the separatists control of the 
200 miles of coastline running from Donetsk to Crimea, effectively halving Ukraine’s Azov Sea 
and Black Sea coastline. The seizure of Mariupol would also represent a symbolic coup for 
the separatists as Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko named the city Ukraine’s provisional 
capital of the Donetsk region in 2014. Importantly, the capture of Mariupol would also provide 
a potential land corridor from Russia to the Crimean peninsular. Although Ukrainian forces 
have secured control of the city, Mariupol remains contested and Ukrainian positions in the 
surrounding area are under almost constant attack. After separatists seized the city’s 
administrative buildings in the spring of 2014 the city was effectively brought back under 
Ukrainian control in June 2014.22 In August 2014 the rebels launched another offensive to 
take Mariupol which was halted by the signing of the Minsk Agreement. However in a sign of 
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the importance of this port to the separatists, Mariupol was shelled again in January 2015 
killing thirty people and injuring 83 others.23 The protracted battle for Mariupol is, however, far 
from over. In August 2016 one Ukrainian soldier was killed and five were wounded after the 
separatists launched an intense artillery barrage near Mariupol. Shyrokyne, a seaside village 
just east of Mariupol was attacked 16 times by Russian backed separatists, nine of them with 
heavy weaponry.24 A month later there were reports from Ukraine’s Anti-Terrorist Operations 
Headquarters that rebels had again fired on Ukrainian positions near Mariupol.25 The constant 
attacks around Mariupol clearly demonstrate a very real and ongoing threat from the 
separatists to Ukraine’s maritime interests and security. 
More widely, Ukraine faces a growing threat from Russia’s maritime capabilities. Ukraine’s 
military doctrine identifies the Russian Federation as a direct threat to Ukraine.26 This threat 
encompasses not just support to Ukrainian separatists, but also a more general military build-
up. For example, Since the annexation, estimates suggest that Moscow has spent almost 
$750 million in upgrading its forces in Crimea and essentially ‘turned the peninsular into an 
iron fortress capable not just of defending itself, but also of delivering missile strikes on ground 
targets in central and southern Ukraine.’27 In the early months after the annexation, Russia 
moved quickly to develop a fully capable air defence system and deployed mobile long range 
anti-ship systems which, together with similar systems installed on the coast of Krasnodar, 
give Russia the ability to control about a third of the Black Sea.28 As part of the more recent 
military build up, Russia has almost doubled the number of service personnel in Crimea, 
creating seven new military formations and eight military units in addition to those available to 
the Black Sea Fleet.29 Russia has also increased the number of tanks and combat armoured 
vehicles in Crimea by a factor of almost seven, artillery systems are 7.2 times higher than 
before the annexation and the number of helicopters and submarines has also doubled.30 
Russia has also replaced the aviation component of the Black Sea Fleet landing its first 14 
multirole SU-27SM and Su-30 fighters at Belbek airport in Crimea.31 Commenting on the 
upgrading and renewal of Russian capabilities in Crimea, Philip Breedlove, Allied Commander 
of NATO in Europe, stated that the new weapons systems, ‘have turned Crimea into a strong 
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force projection beachhead in the region.’32 Russia also has ambitious plans to further 
strengthen the Russian armed forces in Crimea in the period 2020-25 to include increasing 
service personnel, armaments, air assets and missile systems as well as the size, power 
projection capabilities and anti-access area denial ability of the Black Sea Fleet.33 Under these 
plans the Black Sea Fleet will be significantly augmented with up to six new frigates, two new 
missile corvettes and six Kilo class diesel powered submarines.34 
The more traditional threats posed by Russia are complicated by the emergence of a 
separatist 'micro-navy.' There is increasing evidence to suggest that the separatists are 
building their own maritime capabilities including cutters armed with large calibre weapons.35 
A report by a pro-Russian newspaper in May 2015, claimed that an Azov Flotilla, with a 
maritime Spetsnaz element, had been set up in the Donetsk People’s Republic.36 The 
development by the separatists of a small, highly mobile, fleet equipped with anti-tank guided 
missiles, automatic grenade launchers and machine guns, able to carry out attacks on 
Ukrainian shipping and ports or land forces and conduct raids or sabotage missions is clearly 
a serious threat to Ukraine’s coastline and its ability to protect its maritime domain.37 In August 
2016 there were also reports that the separatists had practiced carrying out and defending 
against an amphibious landing.38 A video of the landing posted on line shows soldiers landing 
ashore in several dozen small speedboats and BTR-80 amphibious armoured personnel 
carriers.39 Although the reach of this potential amphibious force is currently limited without 
landing ships, local media reports claimed that the separatists had demonstrated a high level 
of combat readiness in both defensive and offensive coastal operations.40 In a sign of the 
seriousness of this threat, the Ukrainian Defence Ministry announced that Ukrainian marines, 
coastal artillery and other naval detachments were taking part in the Anti-Terrorist Operations 
in order prepare to ‘deter an armed aggression from the sea.’41 
It is therefore evident that Ukraine faces many challenges to its maritime interests. In 
meeting these threats, Ukraine's government has attached significant importance to the urgent 
rebuilding of the Ukrainian Navy. In re-building its navy, Ukraine could be assessed as having 
a number of advantages over other states attempting to develop their maritime capabilities. 
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For example, Ukraine has a clear threat against which to frame its maritime policies and 
capabilities; the war in the east has removed some of the domestic barriers to increased 
defence spending; and the loss of so much of its equipment in theory might reduce the 
physical and intellectual constraints imposed by legacy systems. In practice, however, 
Ukrainian naval regeneration has been impeded by a number of key difficulties. 
 
The Challenges to Ukrainian Maritime Re-generation 
One clear challenge facing the re-building of Ukraine's navy are the losses suffered at the 
hands of Russia. Maritime, Land, and Air Power are all related in important ways, and in many 
respects the key losses that impinge on the future development of the Ukrainian navy are 
those losses on land. The loss of Crimea has had an effect on the Ukrainian navy as bad, or 
worse, as a major defeat at sea. After the Russian annexation, the Ukrainian Navy lost its 
military and maritime infrastructure and ports in Crimea, the majority of its maritime assets and 
the majority of its maritime personnel. In addition, the Ukrainian Navy lost its Headquarters in 
the Black Sea, much of its service’s signals intelligence, training, administration, maintenance 
and logistic infrastructure including its ammunition storage facility in Inkermann valley.42 As a 
result, the truncated Ukrainian Navy has been relocated to Odessa and faces a number of 
challenges in building an effective and safe new maritime base; an essential precondition for 
rebuilding the fleet. Odessa is a commercial rather than military port and currently lacks the 
maritime infrastructure necessary to effectively support and maintain the fleet. Compared with 
Sevastopol, the sea is shallow in Odessa which also creates potential new practical 
challenges if Ukraine’s plans to build an underwater capability able to deter a potential enemy 
are to be realised.43 Considerable investment will be required to turn Odessa into an effective 
maritime base for the fleet. Ukraine’s naval aviation and air support assets have also been 
badly affected. Although the Ukrainian Navy retains some of its naval aviation, the platforms 
are old and numbers remain low. There is also a real question as to the sustainability of 
Ukraine’s remaining helicopters. The nationalisation by Russia of all Ukraine’s state owned 
enterprises in Ukraine, including the Sevastopol Aviation Enterprise, which provides long term 
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maintenance for Ukraine’s helicopters, suggests that maintenance is likely to be problematic 
in the short to medium term.44 
 Nevertheless, the losses in naval platforms are also a serious difficulty because these 
included the majority of its most modern ships. Estimates suggest that the fleet lost 
somewhere between seventy and seventy five percent of its maritime platforms in Crimea.45 In 
total, the Navy lost 11 ships and boats and eight auxiliary vessels as well as its only 
submarine.46 More significantly, these losses also included three of its most modern elements: 
two of its corvettes, the Ternopil and Lutsk, and the command ship, the Slavutich. Losses also 
included such key capital ships as the landing vessel, the Olshansk, two of Ukraine’s 
minesweepers the Cherkasy and the Chernihiv, the Kherson anti-torpedo boat and the 
Feodosiya anti-sabotage boat.47 As a result, the fleet currently operates only ten ships with 33 
support vessels. Reports suggest that half of these platforms need to be repaired and all of 
them are outdated, coming to the end of their operational life in 2018.48 Highlighting the poor 
state of the current fleet, Vice-Admiral Serhiy Hayduk, the former Commander of the Ukrainian 
Navy, stated in January 2016, that the fleet had ‘lost its fighting capacity.'49 Personnel losses 
also posed a significant problem. When Russia annexed Crimea about 12,000 of the 
Ukrainian Navy’s almost 16,000 service personnel were based in the region and almost 75% 
of Ukraine’s maritime personnel remained in Crimea.50 The loss of so many of its experienced 
personnel had a damaging effect on its operational effectiveness, at least in the short term. 
 Another set of difficulties in re-generating the Ukrainian navy are conceptual and policy-
related in nature: it has proven easier to define the threats to Ukraine's maritime interests than 
it has to determine clearly what sort of navy is needed to meet them. Indeed, there has been 
little discussion so far as to what a revived navy would or should actually look like. Most 
suggestions have been conservative in outlook focusing on a balanced fleet and traditional 
roles. Admiral Ihor Kabanenko, a former Ukrainian deputy defence minister, has suggested 
that the Ukrainian Navy should be a small, modern and balanced fleet that consists of surface 
ships and submarines, naval aviation, naval infantry, special operations forces as well as 
other components that can adequately react to threats from the sea.51 Dmytro Tymchuk, a 
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member of the Ukrainian parliamentary committee on national security and defence, has 
suggested that the composition of the new fleet could include two or three frigates, 10-12 
corvettes and at least five submarines.52 Rear Admiral Serhiy Hayduk, former Commander of 
the Ukrainian Navy, has stated that Ukraine should look to revive its submarine force and 
purchase between two and four subs, probably second hand from the Turkish Navy. There is 
also recognition within the naval staff of the need to purchase new minesweepers.53 A paper 
written by the former Deputy Chief of the Navy, Andri Ryzenko, provides the most 
comprehensive outline of the naval staff’s vision of what a future Ukrainian Navy should look 
like. In this paper, Ryzenko examines what assets and capabilities, investment and 
organisational changes the Ukrainian Navy will need in the future to perform its core mission 
of protecting Ukraine’s maritime sovereignty and national interests at sea. According to this 
concept, the fleet’s core mission will be divided into three tasks. The first of these is the 
defence of Ukraine’s coastal area, including its harbours and ports, securing critical 
infrastructure and countering landing operations. The second task is the ability to perform 
general maritime operations and wider sovereignty protection; this includes securing sea lines 
of communication, anti surface and anti-submarine warfare, and defence diplomacy missions. 
The third task is the ability to conduct what Ryzenko terms, offensive maritime operations; 
these would include the ability to destroy enemy ships at sea, provide control of the air where 
needed and the ability to conduct amphibious landings. But there have also been arguments 
that Ukraine should implement a much more modest 'mosquito fleet' concept. A mosquito 
force aims to deny command of the sea to adversaries with larger and more powerful navies.54 
The idea behind a mosquito fleet is that small, fast, and, relatively cheap platforms, backed up 
by gunboats, mines and coastal defence ships engage in a strategy of coastal defence and 
commerce raiding with the aim of disrupting trade and making it impossible for an enemy to 
approach your coastline.55 Under this plan the navy would have a much smaller force with no 
submarines, more limited coastal defence and combat support units and very limited air 
control ability over the fleet. In effect, it would focus on performing only task one of the three 
tasks outlines above.56 
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 A third key challenge to rebuilding the Ukrainian Navy is the gap between the rhetorical 
commitment of the Ukrainian government to the rebuilding of its navy and the actual funding 
priorities. In the light of the ongoing conflict in the east, the government made the decision to 
prioritise defence spending on increasing the combat effectiveness of its land and air rather 
than naval forces.57 As a result of this prioritisation, while Ukraine’s defence budget has 
quadrupled over the last two years, the navy’s share of the overall budget has remained 
small.58 Ukraine’s defence budget in 2014 increased by 24.9% over the previous year and in 
2015 increased again by almost 100% to $3.2bn. In 2016 Ukraine’s defence budget went up 
again by about UAH 7.6 bn ($304 million).59 The Ukrainian Navy’s budget, however, amounts 
to just 2% of the Defence Ministry’s total budget and only 0.5% of the total budget is spent on 
procuring weapons and military equipment for the fleet.60 The lack of investment in the fleet, 
as against the other two services, is clearly seen in Ukraine’s White Book. For example, in 
2015, the army acquired nine new weapon systems, the air force received 12 new acquisitions 
including four helicopters and ten UAV’s, while the navy added no new weapon system or 
capabilities to its arsenal.61  
At the root of these difficulties is a fourth challenge: the parlous state of the economy, 
which has necessitated hard choices. The Ukrainian Government is still fighting a financially 
costly war in the east and the Ukrainian economy has been slow to recover from the crisis. In 
a speech to the UN summit in New York in September 2015 the Ukrainian President, Petro 
Poroshenko, spelt out the high economic costs of the conflict. Poroshenko claimed that the 
conflict in the east was costing Ukraine $5 million a day. He also went on to point out that due 
to the loss of its eastern territories, Ukraine had also lost about a fifth of its economic 
potential.62 Production within the Donbas region has plummeted by 70% and estimates 
suggest this has cost Ukraine 7% of its GDP. Russia’s annexation of the Crimea has also 
contributed to the loss of up to 4% of Ukraine’s GDP.63 In addition, the flow of refugees from 
the region either to Russia or to other parts of Ukraine not only represents an important loss of 
manpower, but also puts additional strain on the Ukrainian economy.64 Although there have 
been some positive signs that Ukraine’s economy will begin to recover in 2017, structural 
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shortcomings and domestic impediments to economic growth such as unsustainable fiscal 
policies, as well as the difficultly of attracting foreign capital suggest that this recovery will be 
at best slow.65  
 Thus, even if the Ukrainian Government were able to give a larger share of the defence 
budget to the navy, the expenses resulting from the capital-intensive nature of naval 
investment would make it difficult to effect any quick transformation in naval capabilities. 
Estimates suggest that in order to rebuild a navy able to perform all of the three core tasks 
discussed earlier, of defending Ukraine’s coastal and maritime area, conducting wider 
maritime operations and offensive maritime operations, the navies budget would need to 
increase by a factor of about twenty. To procure the necessary platforms, including artillery 
boats, landing crafts, corvettes, submarines and auxiliary support, the coastal defence and 
combat support units as well as investing in maritime aviation and personnel, Ukraine would 
need to spend in total, over the next five years, about $3.6 billion.66 Indicating the scale of the 
challenge facing the Ukrainian Government, this amount constitutes significantly more than 
the whole of Ukraine’s defence budget for 2016. Even the modest 'mosquito fleet' upgrading 
of its navy to allow the fleet to effectively perform core task one would require a four fold 
increase in the current naval budget.67 
Complicating all of the above difficulties is the challenge posed by Ukraine's domestic 
politics. Despite the commitment by the President to implement wide-ranging economic 
reforms this will be difficult to achieve given the fragility of the new government coalition, their 
slim majority in the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian parliament), and endemic corruption. The 
latter stems, in particular, from the strong influence that Ukraine’s oligarchs exert on the new 
government. In April 2016 the former prime minster Arseniy Yatsenyuk stepped down and was 
replaced by the former Rada speaker Volodymyr Groisman. The new coalition, made up of the 
political parties of the president and the former prime-minister, are now reliant on support from 
other parliamentary factions and groups as they have a very small parliamentary majority. 
This reduced government majority will make all policy-making more complicated. Further 
compounding these problems is the endemic corruption in Ukraine. Highlighting the extent of 
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the problem, Transparency International, ranked Ukraine 143 out of 173 countries on its 
Corruption Perceptions Index and estimates have suggested that over $12 billion per year 
disappears from the Ukrainian budget.68 Thomas De Waal has argued that corruption is an 
inadequate word to describe the conditions in Ukraine as the problem is not that a well-
functioning state has been corrupted; rather that the corrupt practices themselves now 
constitute the rules by which the state is run.69 Calling into question the ability of the 
government to engage in future reform, the worst corruption ‘occurs at the nexus between 
business oligarchs and governmental officials’ where a small number of oligarchs control over 
70% of Ukraine’s economy and have captured and corrupted Ukraine’s political and judicial 
systems.70  
 
The Ukrainian Navy 
The problems outlined above explain the difficult and contested process through which a new 
Ukrainian navy is emerging. In May 2016 the Ukrainian Defence Ministry announced 
ambitious plans to revive Ukraine’s maritime capabilities and assets by augmenting the fleet 
with up to 30 warships and boats by 2020, and procuring a new maritime patrol aircraft.71 
However, little tangible progress has been made. Signalling that Ukraine is unlikely to receive 
any new warships in the imminent future, and will therefore also struggle effectively to execute 
core tasks two and three, Ukraine’s Project 58350 corvette programme has not only failed to 
produce a single ship but now also appears to have been shelved. Under plans announced in 
2011, 10 corvettes were to be built for the Ukrainian Navy by 2026. However, construction of 
the Project 58350 flagship, Volodymyr Velykyy, had been progressing extremely slowly and a 
decision was made in October 2015 instead to allocate funds towards upgrading the existing 
fleet rather than developing new platforms. While the manufacturers claim that 80% of the hull 
is ready, the ships technical readiness stands at closer to 17% suggesting that the platform is 
unlikely, even if its secures sufficient funding, to be brought on line until at least 2018.72 The 
failure to bring this warship into service as well as the failure to modernise current platforms 
that are past their operational end dates, ultimately calls into question the ability of the 
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Ukrainian Navy to perform even core task one effectively. Little progress has also been made 
in terms of regenerating Ukraine’s maritime aviation. In order for the fleet to be able to 
successfully perform all three tasks, estimates suggest that it would need to add two short 
range medium airlift transport planes, eight smaller transport planes, five maritime patrol 
aircraft and up to 32 UAV’s as well as a full complement of coastal defence capabilities over 
the next five years.73 But so far the Ukrainian Navy has yet to receive any new maritime-air 
assets. 
 The government has also been slow to develop the required maritime infrastructure in 
Odessa.74 In April 2016, more than two years after the loss of Crimea, the Ukrainian Defence 
Ministry eventually announced plans to begin construction of a modern maritime base in 
Odessa for the Ukrainian Navy.75 Three months later the Ukrainian Defence Minister 
confirmed that 100m hryvnyas (about $5m) had been allocated for the construction of the 
Navy headquarters in Odessa.76 Given the challenging security environment in the east, the 
eventual construction of a safe and effective naval base in Odessa is, however, likely to 
remain potentially problematic.77 Not only has there been a spate of terrorist attacks, but the 
situation on the ground in Odessa remains difficult. In January 2016 a Ukrainian sailor 
prevented an attack on a naval facility in Odessa and Ukrainian military patrols also recently 
foiled an attempt to plant a mine near one of the military checkpoints in Odessa.78 There have 
also been a series of terrorist attacks in Odessa calling into question the safety of the fleet and 
its service personnel.79 A recent report on threats to Ukraine by Jane’s Sentinel Security 
Assessment states that government assets, transport infrastructure and assets associated 
with pro-government troops and businessmen in Odessa are currently at risk of attack.80  
 Symptomatic of these difficulties has been the need to embrace less conventional 
solutions. One interesting development has come from a combination of lack of government 
funds, consequent equipment shortages, popular engagement in the war, and the leveraging 
of the opportunities afforded by new technology. This has resulted in some very innovative 
forms of equipment procurement fro the navy. For example, in December 2015, the navy's 
flagship, the frigate Hetman Sagaidachny, was fitted with a new modern navigation radar 
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system financed by a charitable organisation, the ‘Come Back Alive’ volunteer movement. The 
movement raised the funds through internet crowd-funding.81 This organisation has also 
funded similar systems for other platforms.82  
 Faced with problems in procuring more conventional vessels, Ukraine has prioritised the 
acquisition of smaller faster platforms, building, in effect, elements of a ‘mosquito’ force. In 
November 2015 the Ukrainian Navy began construction of the fast attack elements of a 
mosquito fleet when it received two Gurza-M (Project 51855) class small armoured artillery 
boats designed for patrolling coastal sea areas. Currently undergoing sea trials, these boats 
carry a combat module fitted with automatic cannon, a grenade launcher, a machine gun and 
two anti-tank missile systems with laser guidance.83 In March 2016 the Ukrainian Defence 
Ministry signed a contract with the state run Ukroboronprom Company in Kyiv to provide four 
more of these small armoured gunboats for the Ukrainian Navy.84 Two of these gunboats are 
likely to be ‘Centaur’ armoured amphibious assault ships based on the Gurza M, but with 
extended functionality: designed to deliver marines or Special Forces and fire-support to land 
forces under engagement in littoral and inland waters (estuaries, rivers and water-storage 
basins) up to 100 miles.85 Further augmenting Ukraine’s mosquito fleet, a US contractor, 
Willard Marine, will also supply four high speed patrol boats to the Ukrainian Navy as well as 
onsite crew training in the design, operation, maintenance and repair of the boats.86 
 At the same time, despite the difficulties in augmenting the physical capabilities of the 
navy, Ukraine has tried to improve the qualitative aspects of its maritime power.87 In a visit to 
Odessa in September 2015, Vice-Admiral James R. Foggo, commander of the US 6th Fleet, 
commented positively on what he saw as the professionalism of the officer corps and sailors 
of the Ukrainian Navy.88 In this, the conflict in the east has, paradoxically, had a positive spill 
over effect on the building of a professional navy. Training to fight, and fighting, the separatists 
has enhanced the professionalism of Ukraine’s naval personnel, in particular its marines, and 
served as a force multiplier by increasing the ability of the fleet and its personnel to operate 
jointly – both of which are essential if Ukraine is to be able to fulfil its three core tasks in the 
future. In September 2014, the fleet demonstrated its commitment to developing the ability to 
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conduct joint operations, when special units of the Ukrainian Navy and Interior Ministry as well 
as naval aviation units practised a joint search and attack training operation involving the 
detection and destruction of illegal armed groups in the Odessa region.89 In July 2015 another 
joint tactical training exercise took place in the Buh estuary in Mykolayiv Region of Ukraine in 
which the Ukrainian Navy, Air Force and Land forces practised conducting an amphibious 
assault and airborne landing further enhancing their joint skills.90 
Indeed, Ukraine’s marines have in essence been rebuilt from scratch into one of the most 
combat ready elements of Ukraine’s naval forces. When Russia annexed the Crimea, only 
one third of the 600 strong Feodosia based marine battalion opted to return to Ukraine 
depriving the fleet of its most combat ready element.91 The marines subsequently have been 
reconstituted and have gained valuable combat experience fighting in eastern Ukraine. In 
recognition of their enhanced combat abilities units of the Marine Corps were deployed to the 
outskirts of Mariupol in July 2015 to bolster the city’s defences. Commenting on this 
deployment the Ukrainian President stated that the marines ‘will enhance the protection of 
Mariupol significantly.’92 The marines have also benefited from an increase in the number and 
scope of their training exercises. In 2015 the number of Marine Corps battalion and company 
tactical exercises increased 7 and 5.5 fold respectively and platoon field firing exercises also 
went up five fold over the previous year.93 They also held their first brigade level tactical 
training exercise in July 2015 and developed further their joint skills by practising their ability 
to coordinate with air and maritime platforms to capture the shoreline and destroy enemy 
forces.94 The commander of the Ukrainian Navy, Vice-Admiral Serhiy Hayduk, claimed that 
due to these exercises the ‘marine corps have completely renewed its battle readiness.’95 
More recently in August 2016, in response to the announcement by the Russian Federation of 
a large naval exercise in the Black Sea, the Ukrainian President also announced that 
Ukraine’s marines and coastal artillery units would be holding a large military exercise that 
would seek to further heighten combat readiness of all naval forces. The aim of this exercise 
is to further increase the combat readiness of Ukraine’s naval forces – in particular its 
marines.96  
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 The fleet’s active participation in multinational maritime operations has also played an 
important role in enhancing the combat effectiveness of its service personnel. In September 
2014, just months after the annexation of Crimea, Ukraine held its annual Sea Breeze 
exercise demonstrating its commitment to developing the professionalism of its maritime 
forces. As part of this co-hosted multinational exercise, Ukrainian naval personnel practised 
setting up and securing a maritime safety zone in a crisis area.97 In October 2015 Ukraine’s 
frigate, Hetman Sagidachny also took part in a PASSEX joint drill with Bulgarian, Romanian, 
US and Turkish ships in the western part of the Black Sea. The Commander of the Ukrainian 
Navy, Vice Admiral Serhiy Hayduk, claimed that this operation was a testament to the high 
level of cooperation between the Ukrainian and NATO navies and that multinational 
operations like this allow fleet personnel to master NATO standards and enhances their 
interoperability.98  
Ukraine’s marines have also benefited from taking part in multinational maritime exercises. 
These exercises have allowed the marines to develop a number of important skills, ranging 
from the ability to conduct amphibious landings, tracking down an enemy submarine, and 
methods for the protection of critical maritime infrastructure. In July 2016 over 220 US and 
Ukrainian marines, as well as other naval forces, conducted an amphibious landing during the 
annual Sea Breeze 2016 exercise in Odessa. During this exercise the marines practiced 
establishing a safe beachhead ashore and the protection of critical infrastructure.99 
Commenting of the progress made by the Ukrainian naval forces, US Naval Captain, Richard 
Dromerhauser, stated that he had witnessed the flawless execution of a very difficult and 
complex operation. In August 2016 Ukraine’s marines also practised tracking down an enemy 
submarine as part of the Sea Shield multinational military exercise which took place in the 
western part of the Black Sea off Odessa.100 A month later Ukrainian marines participated in 
the Platinum Lynx 2016 exercise held in Romania where, working along side NATO allies, 
they enhanced their interoperability in a combined-training environment.101 The US has also 
recently announced the funding of a two week training course in Mykolaiv for non 
commissioned Marine Corp officers to further enhance their operational and combat 
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effectiveness.102 Despite the progress Ukraine has made in developing its marines, the fleet 
still struggles to train effectively its naval personnel at sea. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the 
lack of working platforms, the total number of hours Ukrainian sailors spent training at sea 
decreased in 2015 from the previous year.103 Providing sufficient sea time in a navy built 
around fast attack craft is likely to be an ongoing problem for the Ukrainian Navy as these 
platforms, by design, necessarily spend less time at sea than larger boats.  
 
Conclusion  
Although Ukraine has important economic and security interests in the Black Sea and an 
increasingly contested coastline in the Sea of Azov, the Ukrainian Government has made very 
little progress in rebuilding the Ukrainian Navy after the Russian annexation of Crimea. This 
year the fleet will finally be augmented by two small attack craft. This, albeit limited, addition to 
the fleets arsenal will go some way to allowing the Ukrainian Navy to begin to fulfil one of its 
three core tasks, the defence of its coastline. Its ability to effectively perform this crucial task 
is, however, likely to be hampered by the failure of the government to provide the necessary 
funding to complete its flagship corvette, upgrade the rest of the fleet which is nearing the end 
of its operational life or provide any new naval air assets.  
Ukraine has, however, made more progress in developing the qualitative elements of its 
maritime power. Due to the conflict in the east, Ukrainian naval forces, in particular the 
marines have significantly enhanced their combat effectiveness and jointery. By increasing the 
amount of training and participation in multinational exercises, Ukraine’s naval personnel have 
improved their ability to perform offensive maritime operation. However, while increasing the 
operational effectiveness of its naval personnel is an important enabler in allowing the 
Ukrainian Navy to effectively perform all three tasks, it cannot substitute for, and is 
compromised by the lack of maritime platforms. As a result of the lack of assets the Ukrainian 
Navy has effectively struggled to increase the amount of time spent training its naval 
personnel at sea.  
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Ukraine also faces significant domestic challenges to rebuilding the fleet. Although its 
economy looks set to grow over the next few years, the Ukrainian Government is still fighting 
a financially costly war in the east that is unlikely to end anytime soon. Ukraine’s ruling 
coalition government will also struggle to pass the necessary raft of legislation needed to 
implement its far reaching economic reform programme in light of its slim majority in 
parliament and endemic corruption. In addition, estimates suggest that the scale of investment 
necessary to build a fleet able to engage across the spectrum of operations is likely to be 
prohibitive; costing more than the whole of Ukraine’s defence budget for 2016. As a result, of 
the financial neglect of the fleet and the economic challenges facing the Ukrainian 
Government, Ukraine will therefore continue to be a maritime state with an inadequate navy.   
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